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A fundamental issue in cognition concerns the manner in which people represent categories of perceptual objects in memory and the decision processes that they use to make classification judgments. One modern approach to addressing this issue is to develop and test formal models of perceptual classification that account not only for classification choice probabilities but also for response times (RTs) . By testing models on their ability to account for the time course of classification, deeper insights may be achieved into the nature of perceptual category representation.
Two of the major models for accounting for multidimensional classification RTs and choice probabilities are exemplar models and decision-boundary models (e.g., Ashby & Maddox, 1994; Maddox & Ashby, 1996; Cohen & Nosofsky, 2003; Lamberts, 1995 Lamberts, , 1998 Lamberts, , 2000 Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997) . According to exemplar models, people represent categories by storing individual exemplars in memory, and they classify objects on the basis of their similarity to the stored exemplars. By contrast, according to decision-boundary models, people form decision boundaries to divide a multidimensional stimulus space into response regions. Anytime a stimulus is perceived to lie in Region A, the observer emits a Category-A response. Hybrid models have also been proposed that assume multiple forms of category representation (e.g., Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994; Vandierendonck, 1995) . However, the present work is motivated primarily around the testing of models that assume single-representation systems.
Although exemplar and decision-bound models are vastly different in underlying spirit, they make remarkably similar predictions of classification RTs and choice probabilities.
According to decision-bound theory, observers should be faster and more accurate at classifying stimuli that lie far from the decision boundary than those that lie close. A fundamental axiom of decision-bound theory is that perception is a noisy process (Ashby & Townsend, 1986) . Because of perceptual noise, stimuli that lie close to the decision bound have a greater chance of being misperceived as falling to the incorrect side of the bound than do stimuli that lie C179 4 far. Thus, accuracy should be greater for stimuli that lie far from the bound. Likewise, the farther away that a stimulus is from the decision bound, the easier it should be to evaluate its location relative to the bound. Thus, stimuli that lie far from the bound are classified more rapidly than are stimuli that lie close. Indeed, so fundamental is this presumed relation that it has been coined the "RT-distance hypothesis" (e.g., Ashby, Boynton, & Lee, 1994) .
A representative from the alternative class of exemplar models is the exemplar-based random-walk (EBRW) model (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997) . According to the EBRW model, when a test item is presented, all category exemplars stored in memory "race" to be retrieved (Logan, 1988) . The rates at which the exemplars race are determined jointly by their strength in memory and by their similarity to the test item. The exemplar that "wins the race" on any given step is retrieved and enters into a random-walk decision process. In a two-category situation, the process is formalized as follows: First, there is a random-walk counter with initial value zero.
The observer establishes criteria representing the amount of evidence needed to make either a Category A response (+A) or a Category B response (-B) . Suppose that exemplar x wins the race on a given step. If x belongs to Category A, then the counter is increased by unit value in the direction of +A, whereas if x belongs to Category B, then the counter is decreased by unit value in the direction of -B. If the counter reaches either criterion +A or -B, then the appropriate response is made. Otherwise, a new race is initiated, another exemplar is retrieved, and the process continues. Classification decision-time is determined by the time required to complete the random walk.
A major conceptual prediction from the EBRW is that the most rapid and accurate classification decisions should be made for items that are highly similar to the exemplars of their own category, and dissimilar to the exemplars of the alternative category. Under such conditions, each retrieved exemplar tends to come from the same category, so the random walk marches consistently toward a single criterion.
C179 5
An important corollary of this conceptual prediction is that the EBRW tends to predict the RT-distance effect (despite the fact that the model doesn't posit the explicit formation of a decision bound). In general, in most classification designs, stimuli that lie far from the presumed decision boundary are highly similar only to exemplars of their own category and are dissimilar to exemplars of the contrast category. Thus, the random walk marches consistently to the correct criterion, leading to highly accurate responding and fast RTs. By contrast, stimuli that lie close to the boundary are similar both to exemplars of their own category and to exemplars of the contrast category. Thus, exemplars from both categories tend to be retrieved, the random walk meanders back and forth, and responding is error-prone and slow.
Developing Contrasts Between Exemplar-Retrieval and Decision-Bound Models Nosofsky and Stanton (2005) sought to contrast the EBRW and decision-boundary accounts of classification RTs. (For related approaches, see Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997, Experiment 2; Rouder & Ratcliff, 2004; Verguts, Storms, & Tuerlinckx, 2003) . The key idea was to decouple the effects of distance-from-boundary and similarity-to-exemplars on RT. The experimental design is illustrated in Figure 1 . The stimuli were a set of Munsell colors of a constant red hue varying in their brightness and saturation. Stimuli enclosed by circles belonged to Category A, whereas stimuli enclosed by triangles belonged to Category B. On each trial, a color would be presented, the subject classified it into Category A or B, and feedback was then provided The key manipulation was that feedback assignments for some of the individual stimuli were varied across conditions. In particular, certain stimulus pairs received probabilistic feedback, whereas other control pairs received deterministic feedback. In the example in Figure   1 , stimulus-pair 4-8 was a probabilistic pair: Stimulus 4 received Category A feedback on 75% of the trials, but received Category B feedback on 25% of the trials. Likewise, Stimulus 8 received Category B feedback on 75% of the trials, but Category-A feedback on 25% of the C179 6 trials. In the Figure-1 example, Pair 5-9 was a deterministic pair that served as a source of comparison to Pair 4-8. Stimulus 5 received Category-A feedback on 100% of the trials, and Stimulus 9 received Category-B feedback on 100% of the trials.
According to decision-boundary theory, observers will establish a boundary for partitioning the perceptual space into response regions. In the present example, the idealobserver boundary is the diagonal line illustrated in the figure. It is critical to realize that the very best an observer can do is to simply classify a stimulus into Category A anytime it falls to the upper-left of the boundary, and to classify a stimulus into Category B anytime it falls to the lower-right. There is no way to adjust the boundary to classify more accurately the probabilistic pairs because the trial-by-trial probabilistic feedback assignments are randomly determined.
Therefore, because the pairs are the same distance from the decision boundary, these models predict identical classification RTs (and choice probabilities) for the probabilistic and deterministic pairs.
By contrast, the EBRW model predicts slower RTs and less accurate responding for the probabilistic pairs than the deterministic pairs. In the Figure-1 example, in cases in which Stimulus 4 is presented and tokens of Exemplar 4 are retrieved from memory, .75 of the steps in the random walk will move in the direction of criterion A, but .25 of the steps will move in the direction of criterion B. By comparison, presentations of the deterministic pairs will result in more consistent steps of the random walk, leading to faster RTs and more accurate responding.
Across two experiments, the qualitative predictions from the EBRW were supported over those from the decision-boundary model. In our view, this support for the EBRW model was intriguing: To reiterate, in the Figure-1 paradigm, an ideal observer would simply ignore the probabilistic feedback and emit a Category-A response whenever a stimulus falls to the upperleft of the diagonal boundary. However, even after five days of testing, RTs for the probabilistic pairs were slower than for the deterministic pairs, suggesting a stubborn influence of exemplarbased retrieval. The primary goal of the present research was to test for the generality of these effects using fundamentally different category structures and types of stimuli. In the perceptualclassification and cognitive-neuroscience literatures, a major distinction has been drawn between "rule-based" category structures and "information-integration" structures (Ashby & Maddox, 2005) . Intuitively, rule-based structures are those in which it is easy for an observer to verbalize the optimal strategy for classification. In rule-based problems, observers can perform at essentially optimal levels by establishing separate criteria along each of the multiple dimensions that compose a set of stimuli. Separate, independent decisions are then made about a stimulus's value along each of these dimensions. The separate decisions are then combined to determine whether or not the verbalizable rule has been satisfied. For example, suppose that the stimuli vary in their size and brightness, and that membership in a target category is defined by a conjunctive rule. Then a subject may classify an object into the target category if it is both sufficiently large and sufficiently bright. In this case, the observer establishes a fixed criterion along the size dimension and a fixed criterion along the brightness dimension, and classifies an object into the target category only if it satisfies both criteria. A key point (see Figures 2 and 4 for illustrations) is that, for rule-based problems, the decision boundaries that divide the space into response regions are straight lines that are orthogonal to the coordinate axes (Ashby & Gott, 1988) .
By contrast, in information-integration category problems, the optimal strategy requires that perceptual information from at least two dimensions be combined prior to any classification decisions. Instead of making separate, independent decisions along each dimension, the decision boundaries for information-integration problems will not be orthogonal to the coordinate axes, and will be difficult or impossible to verbalize. An example of an information-integration C179 8 structure is the Figure-1 structure used in the Nosofsky and Stanton (2005) experiments. Here, the optimal decision boundary is the diagonal line illustrated in the figure.
In our view, a compelling idea is that, whereas it may be difficult to form decision boundaries for information-integration structures, it may be far more natural to form decision boundaries for rule-based ones. Indeed, the classic idea that much of classification proceeds by establishing and evaluating logical rules continues to be a central one in cognitive psychology (Ashby et al., 1998; Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Feldman, 2000; Fific, Little, & Nosofsky, 2010; Goodman, Tenenbaum, Feldman, & Griffiths, 2008; Lafond, Lacouture, & Cohen, 2009; Nosofsky et al., 1994) . Furthermore, researchers have argued that performance on rule-based and information-integration category structures may be mediated by separate cognitive systems and by distinct anatomical structures in the brain. They have also amassed much evidence to support this view (Ashby & Maddox, 2005) . For example, a wide variety of behavioral and neuropsychological dissociations have been reported in which different effects of experimental variables are observed for rule-based versus information-integration structures. Accordingly, in the present studies, our primary goal was to test for effects of probabilistic feedback assignments in situations involving rule-based category structures rather than information-integration structures. Once again, in the to-be-reported studies, an ideal observer would simply ignore the probabilistic feedback and classify an object based on its position with respect to a set of optimally placed, rule-based boundaries. By contrast, if exemplar-retrieval processes play a role even in situations involving rule-based structures, then classification responding should be slower and more error-prone for stimuli that receive probabilistic feedback.
Although some well known studies have previously reported evidence of exemplar influences in rule-based categories (e.g., Allen & Brooks, 1991; Regehr & Brooks, 1993) , the present studies are designed to provide more incisive tests of that hypothesis. In particular, as we argue more fully in the on-line supplement to this article, the previous studies showed only C179 9 that not all participants relied solely on certain minimally complex rules that may have been difficult to discover or use in the first place. Instead, the participants in those studies made use of information provided along additional stimulus dimensions that was advantageous for learning the categories. By contrast, in the present designs, the optimal rules should be easy to discover and use, and attending to the additional "exemplar-specific" information can only hurt performance.
Experiment 1
A potential way to get started in the present investigation would be to test a unidimensional rule-based structure by rotating the Figure-1 information-integration category structure 45 degrees. However, exemplar models make allowance for the idea that subjects attend selectively to relevant dimensions. Assuming that this form of selective attention takes place, then there would be no psychological distinction between the probabilistic and deterministic pairs in Figure 1 (rotated 45 degrees). Therefore, we needed to design alternative structures to contrast the exemplar and decision-bound models.
The probabilistic rule-based category structure that we used in Experiment 1 is illustrated in Figure 2 . The stimuli were composed of two highly separable dimensions (Garner, 1974; Shepard, 1964) : the degree of saturation of a red-colored rectangle, and the left-right placement of a vertical line within the rectangle. We used separable-dimension stimuli in order to increase the plausibility that subjects might adopt logical rules as a basis for classification.
There were four values per dimension combined orthogonally to produce the 16-member stimulus set. As illustrated in the figure, the 16 stimuli were divided into four categories, each described by a conjunctive rule. For example, an object is a member of Category A if it has saturation value less than or equal to 2 AND line-position value greater than or equal to 3. The hypothesized rule-based boundaries for dividing the space into category regions are depicted in C179 10 the figure. It is a rule-based structure because the boundaries are orthogonal to the coordinate axes. Indeed, similar multiple-category structures defined by conjunctive rules have been tested in a number of previous experiments designed to assess the properties of rule-based classification (e.g., Maddox, Filoteo, Hejl, & Ing, 2004) .
The critical manipulation, illustrated schematically in the figure, is that two stimuli were assigned probabilistic rather than deterministic feedback. In the Figure- 2 example, Stimulus 6 is assigned to Category-A on 75% of the trials in which it is presented, but is assigned to Category-D on 25% of the trials. Likewise, Stimulus 11 is assigned to Category-D on 75% of the trials, but assigned to Category-A on 25% of the trials. In comparison, whereas Stimuli 6 and 11 receive probabilistic feedback, the comparison Stimuli 7 and 10 receive deterministic feedback.
The probabilistic pair (6 and 11) and the deterministic pair (7 and 10) are the same distance from the rule-based boundaries, so decision-bound models predict that they should have the same RTs and accuracies. By contrast, exemplar models predict that the probabilistic pair should be classified more slowly and less accurately than the deterministic pair.
An important property of the design is that there is no plausible way to adjust the form of the rule-based boundaries to improve classification performance on the probabilistic stimuli, because the feedback is chosen randomly on each individual trial.
1 Another advantage is that to achieve accurate performance, subjects must attend to both dimensions that compose the stimuli. Therefore, the exemplar model cannot "escape" its prediction that the probabilistic pairs will be classified less efficiently than the deterministic pairs by positing that an irrelevant dimension has been ignored.
The design also allows one to test for generalization effects of the probabilistic feedback.
According to the EBRW model, test items do not retrieve only their own memory traces.
Instead, they may also retrieve exemplars to which they are similar. Therefore, for the same reasons described earlier, stimuli that are similar to the probabilistic pairs might be classified more slowly than are comparison stimuli that are similar to the corresponding deterministic C179 11 pairs. For example, in Figure 2 , stimuli 2 and 5 from Category A might be classified more slowly and less accurately than the comparison stimuli 3 and 8 from Category B, because the former border a probabilistic stimulus, whereas the latter border a deterministic one. The extent to which the exemplar model does indeed predict such generalization effects, however, depends on its parameter settings, so we do not state it as a strong prediction from the model.
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A final goal of Experiment 1 was to address an idea advanced by Jones, Love, and Maddox (2006) , namely that evidence for exemplar retrieval in classification may reflect only very short-term memory processes (see also Petrov & Anderson, 2005; Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2002) . For example, in the present kinds of designs, effects of probabilistic feedback may arise only when a stimulus is associated with incorrect feedback on trial n, and the same stimulus is then presented on the following trial n+1. To address the concern, we extended the design by also including blocks of test trials in which no feedback was presented. Continued effects of the probabilistic feedback during the test blocks would provide evidence of longerterm effects of the manipulation.
Method Participants
Twelve participants were recruited from the Indiana University community. Eleven participated in five 1-hour sessions, one per day; whereas one completed four sessions. (The extended data-collection at the individual-subject level was intended to allow for detailed quantitative modeling. However, for reasons described later, we focus here on the major qualitative pattern of results, rather than on quantitative fitting.) Each participant received $8
per session, plus a potential $3 bonus per session, depending on performance. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and claimed to have normal color vision. (http://wallkillcolor.com/). Multidimensional-scaling studies were used to verify that the psychological structure of the stimuli matched closely the schematic one shown in Figure 2 .
Details of the scaling study are provided in the on-line supplement.
Design and Procedure
The stimuli were divided into 4 categories with the structure depicted in Figure 2 .
The center four stimuli -6, 7, 10, and 11 -were designated the critical stimuli. In Condition 7/10, Stimuli 7 and 10 were the probabilistic critical stimuli and Stimuli 6 and 11 were the deterministic critical stimuli. These assignments were reversed in Condition 6/11. The probabilistic stimuli were assigned to their nominal category on 75% of the trials. On the remaining 25% of trials, the probabilistic stimuli were assigned to the diagonally opposite category. All remaining stimuli received deterministic assignments for their respective categories. Half of the subjects participated in Condition 7/10 and half in Condition 6/11.
The categories were associated with the keyboard keys S, D, K, and L. Participants responded to category S with the third (ring) finger of their left hand; category D with the lefthand middle finger; K with the right-hand middle finger; and L with the right-hand third finger.
The category-to-quadrant mappings were balanced across participants with the constraint that each hand made the response associated with one deterministic and one probabilistic category.
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The mappings were also constrained to ensure that one probabilistic category was assigned to the third finger of one hand and the other to the middle finger of the opposite hand. The same was true for the deterministic categories. These constraints leave 16 of 24 possible category-toquadrant assignments; 12 were randomly selected for use in the experiment.
In the first session, participants completed 850 training trials (trials with feedback), with a short break every 213 trials. In sessions 2 to 5, participants completed 7 sets of trials, with each set consisting of one block of 64 training trials followed by one block of 64 test trials (trials without feedback). During these sessions participants were given a short break after every two sets of training and test blocks.
During the training blocks, the four center critical stimuli were presented on 50% of the trials. On the remaining trials, one of the remaining 12 stimuli was presented. Stimulus selection on each trial was random within these constraints. Thus, not including the first day, each of the critical stimuli was presented roughly 224 times during the training blocks, whereas each of the remaining stimuli was presented roughly 75 times. The increased presentation probability for the critical pairs was intended to increase the power of the experimental manipulation. Because of the symmetric arrangement of the critical stimuli, this increased presentation frequency does not affect the form of the optimal rule-based bounds.
The blocks of 64 test trials were divided into 4 sub-blocks of 16 trials each. Within each sub-block, each of the individual 16 stimuli was presented once in a random order. Thus, during the course of the experiment, each individual stimulus was presented 96 times during the test blocks.
On each training trial, a fixation cross was presented in the center of the screen for .5 s.
Then a stimulus was presented and remained on the screen until a response was made.
Following the response, feedback was presented on the screen for 1 s (either "Correct" or "Incorrect" or "Too Slow" if the RT was greater than 5 s).
3 Following the feedback, there was a C179
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.5 s blank interval before the next trial. Test trials were identical to training trials with the exception that no feedback was presented.
Participants were instructed to keep their fingers resting on the appropriate keys and to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. Subjects were told that the task is a difficult one, and so perfect accuracy may not be possible, and that whether they received a bonus was determined by their overall performance.
Results
We excluded the first day of training from the analyses. In addition, for each individual subject/item combination, we excluded trials in which the RT was longer than 3 standard deviations above the mean or was shorter than 150 ms. The latter procedures led to excluding less than 2% of the data for each individual subject.
As explained, we refer to the four center stimuli as the probabilistic and deterministic critical stimuli. In addition (see Figure 2 ), we will refer to stimuli 1, 4, 13, and 16 as the corner stimuli. When a corner stimulus comes from the same category as a probabilistic (deterministic) critical stimulus, we will refer to it as a probabilistic (deterministic) corner stimulus. For example, in Figure 2 , Stimulus 1 is a probabilistic corner stimulus, whereas Stimulus 4 is a deterministic corner stimulus. We refer to all remaining stimuli as adjacent stimuli, because they are horizontally or vertically adjacent to a single critical stimulus. When an adjacent stimulus neighbors a probabilistic (deterministic) critical stimulus, we will refer to it as a probabilistic (deterministic) adjacent stimulus.
The correct mean RTs and accuracies for the critical pairs, adjacent stimuli, and corner stimuli are displayed as a function of feedback (probabilistic versus deterministic), separately for the training and test blocks, in Figure 3 . (Because the pattern of results did not differ as a C179 15 function of condition, 7/10 versus 6/11, the figure collapses over that variable.) For the probabilistic pairs, a correct response was defined according to an ideal observer. For example, for a subject in Condition 6/11, the correct response for stimulus 6 was Category A, regardless of the feedback provided on a given trial.
As can be seen, in both the training and the test blocks, mean RTs for the probabilistic critical pairs were considerably slower than for the deterministic critical pairs. In addition, in both the training and test blocks, mean accuracies for the probabilistic critical pairs were lower than for the deterministic critical pairs. The same pattern of results, for both RTs and accuracies during both training and test, tends to be observed for the adjacent and corner stimuli, although the magnitude of the effects is somewhat diminished. These latter results provide evidence for a generalized effect of the probabilistic feedback manipulation on performance. The overall pattern of results is consistent with the predictions from the EBRW model and challenges the predictions from the rule-based, distance-from-boundary models.
To confirm these observations, we conducted 2x2x3x2 analyses of variance of the data, with condition (7/10 versus 6/11) as a between-subjects factor, and with block type (training versus test), item type (critical, adjacent, corner), and feedback (probabilistic versus deterministic) as within-subjects factors. These analyses were conducted separately for the correct mean RTs and the accuracies. 4 We report here only the most important of the Although a full report goes beyond the scope of this article, we also conducted detailed individual-subject analyses of the complete RT distributions of the individual stimuli. Because of the assumption of a non-linear relation between RT and distance, certain versions of the RTdistance model that posit increased perceptual variability for the probabilistic stimuli can predict slowed mean RTs for those stimuli (see Nosofsky & Stanton, 2005 , for details). However, these versions also predict that the very fastest RTs associated with the probabilistic critical stimuli will be faster than the very fastest RTs associated with the deterministic ones. Our RT-distributionbased analyses revealed a pattern that went significantly in the opposite direction (a result predicted correctly by the EBRW).
Discussion
In sum, the main pattern of results was that the probabilistic stimuli were classified more slowly and less accurately than were the corresponding deterministic stimuli that were the same distance from the decision boundary. There was also evidence of generalization effects, such that stimuli that were similar to the probabilistic pairs were classified more slowly and less accurately than were analogous stimuli that were similar to the deterministic pairs. This overall pattern of results is consistent with the predictions from exemplar models of classification, but challenges the predictions from standard distance-from-boundary models. Furthermore, the results were observed in a domain involving salient rule-based category structures with stimuli C179 17 composed of separable dimensions, conditions that might foster the application of decisionbound strategies.
Nevertheless, a limitation of Experiment 1 was that the probabilistic and deterministic stimuli were each associated with separate category labels. For example, in Figure 2 , probabilistic stimulus 6 is associated with Category A, whereas deterministic stimulus 7 is associated with Category B. Possibly, the probabilistic feedback manipulations led, at least in part, to category-level influences rather than exemplar-specific influences. For example, because of the probabilistic feedback associated with, say, Category A, an observer may have less confidence in making Category-A responses, which is reflected in slowed RTs and lower accuracies for stimuli associated with that category.
Although such influences are not formalized in standard distance-from-boundary models, it is straightforward to formalize them in extended decision-bound models that posit stochastic forms of evidence accumulation (e.g., Ashby, 2000; Nosofsky & Stanton, 2005) .
For example, Nosofsky and Stanton formalized a random-walk version of decision-bound theory that implements distance-from-boundary effects. The representational assumptions in this random-walk distance-from-boundary (RW-DFB) model are the same as in the standard version, with observers establishing decision boundaries to divide the stimulus space into category regions. However, instead of assuming a descriptive function for relating RTs to distance-from-boundary, a random-walk or counter process is assumed. Specifically, analogous to the EBRW model, there are counters initialized at zero that takes steps towards category criteria. On each step of the process, a percept is sampled at random from a distribution associated with the presented stimulus. If the percept falls in the Category-A region defined by the decision boundaries, then a counter associated with Category-A is incremented by unit value. The perceptual sampling process continues until a criterion on one of the category counters has been reached, at which time the observer emits the categorization response.
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Under suitable assumptions, it is straightforward to show that the RW-DFB model predicts the fundamental distance-from-boundary effect. However, a generalization of the model would allow different criterion settings across the alternative categories. In the case of the present Experiment 1, a reasonable hypothesis is that subjects may set their criteria higher for categories that have been associated with probabilistic feedback rather than with only deterministic feedback, thereby accounting for the slowed RTs of the probabilistic stimuli.
It might still be possible to tell apart the EBRW model from this RW-DFB model on grounds of detailed quantitative fits to the individual-subject classification data. For example, for the Figure-2 design, the RW-DFB model tends to predict roughly equal effects of the probabilistic feedback on all members of a category. By contrast, the EBRW model predicts primarily exemplar-specific effects; however, depending on parameter settings, it predicts stimulus-generalization effects of varying magnitude as well. Especially because there are likely to be individual-subject differences, teasing apart these alternatives in the present design requires detailed, individual-subject model fitting. In this article, rather than pursuing this formal quantitative-comparison route, we decided instead to test a new category structure that yields sharply contrasting qualitative predictions from the models.
Experiment 2
The new category structure is illustrated schematically in Again, the key manipulation was that one pair of stimuli received probabilistic feedback, whereas a comparison pair received deterministic feedback. In the Figure-4 example, Stimulus 2 received Category-A feedback on 75% of the trials, but received Category-B feedback on 25% of the trials; whereas Stimulus 5 received Category-B feedback on 75% of the trials, but
Category-A feedback on 25% of the trials. The comparison deterministic pair, analogously positioned in the stimulus space, was Pair 3-7. The assignment of probabilistic feedback and deterministic feedback to Pairs 2-5 and 3-7 was balanced across subjects.
Again, the EBRW model predicts that the probabilistic pairs should be classified more slowly and less accurately, on average, than the deterministic pairs. By contrast, because the form of feedback does not affect the distance of the stimuli from the ideal-observer, rule-based boundaries, distance-from-boundary models predict no effect of the probabilistic feedback.
Furthermore, unlike in Experiment 1, the pairs that receive probabilistic versus deterministic feedback are not confounded with separate category labels. That is, one member of each pair is assigned to Category A, and the other member of each pair is assigned to Category B. Thus, the design sharply contrasts the predictions of the EBRW model with stochastic, random-walk versions of decision-bound theory that allow separate criterion settings for different categories.
The Figure-4 structure was also designed to rule out another possible decision-bound explanation of probabilistic-feedback effects. In particular, we considered the possibility that, because the probabilistic stimuli from opposing categories differed from one another on a single dimension, subjects might experience uncertainty in applying rules along that dimension. For example, in Figure 4 , because of the inconsistent feedback provided for Pair 2-5, subjects might experience uncertainty in positioning the horizontal, rule-based boundary, leading to slowed decisions along that dimension. Crucially, however, if there is uncertainty in positioning the rulebased boundary, then the influence of that uncertainty should extend to all stimulus pairs that conditions, the EBRW model might predict similar slowing due to stimulus-generalization effects from specific exemplars. However, as illustrated in Figure 4 , we arranged the stimulus spacings such that Pairs 2-5 and 4-6 were far separated, and so that Pairs 3-7 and 4-8 were far separated. Therefore, any effects of exemplar-specific generalization from the probabilistic critical stimuli should be minimized.
Finally, to ensure that any effects of probabilistic feedback assignments were relatively long-term, the experiment also included test blocks in which all feedback was withheld.
In sum, for the present design, the EBRW model predicts slowed RTs and lowered accuracies for the probabilistic critical pairs compared to the deterministic critical pairs, with far less generalized slowing for the adjacent pairs. By contrast, rule-based decision bound models predict either no effects of the probabilistic feedback, or else effects that extend equally to the probabilistic pairs and their adjacent, neighboring pairs in the space. 
Stimuli
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The stimuli were the same type as in Experiment 1. There were 9 stimuli composed of all combinations of 3 levels of saturation (Munsell-chroma levels 3.5, 5.5 and 18) and 3 positions of the vertical line (80, 64 and 20 pixels from the left-hand side of the rectangle).
Multidimensional-scaling studies, described fully in the on-line supplement, were used to verify that the psychological structure of the stimuli matched closely the intended structure shown in Figure 4 .
Design and Procedure
The stimuli were divided into 2 categories with the structure depicted in Figure 4 .
Stimulus pairs 2-5 and 3-7 were designated the critical stimuli. In Condition 2/5, Stimuli 2 and 5
were the probabilistic critical stimuli and Stimuli 3 and 7 were the deterministic critical stimuli.
These assignments were reversed in Condition 3/7. On each individual trial of training, the probabilistic critical stimuli received feedback consistent with their nominal category with probability .75, and received feedback consistent with the contrast category with probability .25.
All remaining stimuli received deterministic feedback assignments. Response keys for categories A and B were always keys 'F' and 'J', respectively.
In the first part of the experiment, participants completed a 405-trial training phase (trials with feedback). During this phase, each of the 9 stimuli was presented 45 times, in a random order. On each trial, a fixation cross was presented in the center of the screen for .5 s. A stimulus was then presented in the center of the screen until a response was made. Following the response, feedback was presented on the screen for 1 s (either "Correct" or "Incorrect" or "Too Slow" if the RT was greater than 5 s). Following the feedback, there was a .5 s blank interval before the next trial. Participants received a break every 90 trials during the initial training phase and between the initial training phase and the final sets of training and test blocks (see below).
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Following the initial training, participants were informed that their performance would be assessed to determine whether they received the bonus. Participants then completed a block of another 45 training trials, followed by a block of 45 test trials (trials without feedback), and then followed by a further block of 45 training trials and a further block of 45 test trials. Within each of these final blocks, each of the 9 stimuli was presented 5 times in a random order. The procedure for the training blocks was the same as in the initial training phase. The procedure for the test blocks was the same as for the training blocks, except that no feedback was presented. Instructions were as in Experiment 1.
Results
We analyzed the data from only the final four training and test blocks. We excluded from analysis participants whose accuracy was less than .85 for the deterministic items in the final training and test blocks (because we judged that such participants might have been insufficiently motivated or failed to understand instructions). This procedure led to the removal of 7 participants from Condition 3/7 and 3 participants from Condition 2/5, leaving 15 participants in each condition. We excluded trials in which the RT was greater than 3 standard deviations above the mean for each participant/item combination, or less than 150 ms. This procedure was applied separately for the training and test blocks and led to the removal of less than 1% of the trials.
Correct responses were again defined with respect to an ideal observer, not in terms of whether the response happened to match the probabilistic feedback provided on each individual trial. For example, in Figure 4 , the correct response for Stimulus 2 is Category A and the correct response for Stimulus 5 is Category B.
We will refer to the stimulus pair that is adjacent to the probabilistic critical pair as the probabilistic adjacent pair; whereas the pair that is adjacent to the deterministic critical pair is C179 23 termed the deterministic adjacent pair. For example, in Figure 4 , Pair 4-6 is the probabilistic adjacent pair and Pair 4-8 is the deterministic adjacent pair. Our analyses of the mean RTs and accuracies for the adjacent pairs include only the Category-B members, because Stimulus 4 is common to each pair (see Figure 4) . With respect to the adjacent pairs, the key question is whether performance on the probabilistic pair differs from the deterministic pair. To address this question, the analysis is restricted to the unique member of each pair.
The mean correct RTs and accuracies for the critical pairs and the adjacent pairs are displayed as a function of feedback (probabilistic versus deterministic), separately for the training and testr blocks, in Figure 5 . (Again, because the pattern of results did not differ as a function of condition, 2/5 versus 3/7, the figure collapses over that variable.) As can be seen, in both the training and the test blocks, mean RTs for the probabilistic critical pairs were considerably slower than for the deterministic critical pairs. In addition, in both the training and test blocks, mean accuracies for the probabilistic critical pairs were lower than for the deterministic critical pairs. By contrast, there were much smaller differences in performance between the probabilistic adjacent pairs and the deterministic adjacent pairs, in both the training and the test blocks. This pattern of results is consistent with the predictions from the EBRW model and challenges the predictions from the rule-based, distance-from-boundary models.
To confirm these observations, we conducted 2x2x2x2 analyses of variance of the data, with condition (2/5 versus 3/7) as a between-subjects factor, and with block-type (training versus test), item type (critical pair versus adjacent pair), and feedback (probabilistic versus deterministic) as within-subjects factors. These analyses were conducted separately for the In follow-up analyses, we attempted to ascertain whether some subset of our observers may have been rule-based responders. We reasoned that observers using deterministic rules and acting as ideal observers would be most likely to correctly classify the probabilistic stimuli into appropriate categories. Therefore, we focused consideration on those observers in each condition with the very lowest error rates and analyzed their RTs. Unfortunately, these follow-up analyses did not yield clear-cut conclusions. As was the case for the full set of observers, the subset of highest-accuracy observers showed significantly slower RTs for the probabilistic critical pairs than the deterministic critical pairs. Furthermore, the magnitude of the slow-down was reduced for the adjacent pairs compared to the critical pairs. Unfortunately, the interaction effect did not approach statistical significance. We cannot know whether the lack of a significant interaction reflects inadequate statistical power associated with the small subset of highestaccuracy subjects, or if it is pointing to a group of rule-based responders who experienced uncertainty along the entire range of the probabilistic-feedback dimension. With larger sample
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sizes, the present design may be an excellent one for localizing rule-based versus exemplarbased responders.
General Discussion
In summary, across two experiments using rule-based category structures, we found that stimuli that received probabilistic feedback were classified more slowly and less accurately than were comparison stimuli that received deterministic feedback. There was also some evidence of generalization effects, in which RTs for stimuli that were highly similar to the probabilistic exemplars were slowed. These effects were relatively long-term ones, extending into test blocks in which all feedback was withheld. The results are consistent with the predictions from exemplar models of classification, but challenge models that posit that classification RT is a function solely of the distance of a stimulus from rule-based decision boundaries. The results also challenged versions of rule-based decision-bound models in which category evidence is accumulated in stochastic fashion, and where the required amount of evidence may differ for probabilistic versus deterministic categories.
In our view, these results are particularly intriguing given that the use of the simple rulebased decision bounds would have been the optimal strategy for performing the tasks. To reiterate, for the present tasks, the best strategy would have been to ignore the probabilistic feedback associated with specific exemplars and to classify solely in accordance with the logical rules. Although Nosofsky and Stanton's (2005) previous study also found evidence for exemplar-retrieval effects in a similar design, those results were limited to a situation involving an information-integration category structure, where no easily verbalizable rules were available.
Thus, the current results lend considerable generality to the previous findings, and provide C179 26 rather impressive evidence for a role of exemplar-retrieval processes in perceptual
classification.
An interesting question for future research is to consider multiple-system accounts of performance in our tasks. According to the COVIS model of Ashby et al. (1998) , there are two systems responsible for category learning: an explicit system that forms verbalizable rules, and an implicit system that is mediated by procedural learning. A fundamental assumption in past applications of COVIS is that rule-based categories, such as the conjunctive-rule category structures tested in the present research, are learned by the explicit rule system. Indeed, in innumerable previous studies, COVIS theorists have modeled performance in such tasks by fitting rule-based decision-bound models to the data. The results from the present research, however, challenge the assumption that performance in such tasks is mediated solely by application of these explicit rules. Possibly, a COVIS theorist might argue that, because of the inclusion of probabilistic stimuli in our designs, subjects' confidence in the rules was weakened enough for other processes to intrude. However, COVIS theorists have tested numerous previous designs involving rule-based category structures in which error rates were high, due to use of overlapping category distributions or hard-to-discriminate stimuli. Despite the errors in responding, rule-based decision bounds were presumed to govern performance. Therefore, a COVIS theorist would need to explain why other processes would intrude only in our present designs, but not in previous ones that have involved errors in responding.
An alternative multiple-system approach is Erickson and Kruschke's (1998) ATRIUM model. According to this model, a rule-based module and an exemplar-based module operate in concert, and the system learns which module to apply in different regions of the category space. In essence, ATRIUM subsumes exemplar models of classification as a special case, so arguments in favor of exemplar models must rely on parsimony. Nevertheless, to the extent that an ATRIUM account of performance in our tasks is correct, then perhaps logical-rule processes predominated in those regions of our category structures that involved deterministic C179 27 feedback assignments; whereas exemplar-retrieval processes operated in regions that involved probabilistic feedback. If so, then perhaps brain-imaging techniques might reveal distinct neural signatures reflecting alternative classification strategies operating in probabilistic versus deterministic regions of the space. We leave these and related questions motivated by our study as issues for future research.
